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In the current paper I will argue that the notion of affordances offers an alternative to
theory ofmind (ToM) approaches in studying social engagement in general and in explaining
social engagement in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) speciﬁcally. Affordances are the
possibilities for action offered by the environment. In contrast to ToM approaches, the
concept of affordances implies the complementarity of person and environment and rejects
the dualism ofmind and behavior. In linewith the Gibsonian idea that a childmust eventually
perceive the affordances of the environment for others aswell for herself in order to become
socialized, I will hypothesize that individuals with ASD often do not perceive the same
affordances in the environment as other people do and have difﬁculties perceiving others’
affordances. This can lead to a disruption of interpersonal behaviors. I will further argue
that the methods for studying social engagement should be adapted if we want to take
interaction into account.
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How people are able to interact successfully with each other is a
question raised and answered by researchers from different dis-
ciplines. While this question can be answered in numerous ways,
the answer that emerges from a signiﬁcant part of the literature is
by employing a “Theory of Mind” (ToM). Although there are dif-
ferent deﬁnitions of this concept, the term “ToM” generally refers
to the ability to attribute mental states to the self and other people
in order to explain and predict behavior (Premack and Woodruff,
1978; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). ToM approaches assume that
people have a ToM that enables them to infer, either explicitly or
implicitly, the mental state of a person from that person’s behav-
ior (Van Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013). This implies that
ToM theory separates the (supposedly meaningless) observable
behavior from the (meaningful) private mind in a Cartesian way
and ToM approaches have been criticized for that way of thinking
(Gallagher, 2004; Reddy, 2008; Leudar and Costall, 2009/2011).
From this perspective you need a ToM in order to interact success-
fully with other people. In addition to the criticism of Cartesian
dualism, ToM approaches have also been criticized for isolating
social understanding from the actual engagement (De Jaegher and
Di Paolo, 2007; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009). According to ToM
approaches, meaning is constructed in the minds of social par-
ticipants. The idea that meaning is created in the ongoing active
interaction between persons is not taken into account (Fuchs and
De Jaegher, 2009).
In contrast to ToM approaches, more embodied approaches
assume that mind and behavior are not separate. People directly
perceive other persons’ intentions in their actions without the
need for an indirect, implicit or explicit, process of inference
and theory (Gallagher, 2001, 2004; Good, 2007). This is con-
sistent with the concept of “affordances.” Affordances are the
action possibilities that the environment offers to an animal
or person (Gibson, 1986). It is assumed that affordances are
perceived directly, i.e., without the intervention of certain cog-
nition operations, such as ToM (Gibson, 1986; Barrett, 2011).
Directly does not mean that every affordance in the environment
is automatically perceived and acted upon. The perception of
affordances is dependent upon the particular information that
is picked up by the perceiver and the information pick-up is
dependent upon the characteristics and capabilities of the per-
ceiver (e.g., the central nervous system, perceptual system, motor
skills) and the interaction that the perceiver has with the environ-
ment (Gibson and Pick, 2000). Thus, an affordance is inherently
speciﬁc to a particular perceiver. What an object or the action
of another person affords one person may be different from
what the same object or action affords someone else. What is
relevant in the environment cannot be separated from the per-
ceiver, it is not a pre-given. In addition to individual differences,
different groups may also show differences in the perception
of affordances. Differences have been found between novices
and experts (Charness et al., 2001), between children with dif-
ferent motor skills (Adolph et al., 1993), between children and
adults (Thelen, 2008), and between typically developing persons
and persons with a physical or mental impairment (Loveland,
1991).
Gibson (1986) explicitly states that the perception of social
affordances, which may be deﬁned as the affordances provided by
other people’s behavior, is just as direct and based on the pick-up
of information as the perception of affordances in the physical
environment: “It is just as much based on stimulus information as
is the simpler perception of support that is offered by the ground
under one’s feet. For animals and other persons can only give
off information about themselves insofar as they are tangible,
audible, odorous, tastable and visible” (Gibson, 1986, p. 135).
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However, social affordances are also different from affordances
of the physical environment: “They are so different from ordi-
nary objects that infants learn almost immediately to distinguish
them fromplants and non-living things.When touched they touch
back, when struck they strike back; in short they interact with
the observer and with one another. Behavior affords behavior. . .”
(Gibson, 1986, p. 135). This means that the actions of persons
in social interaction are not only dependent upon the attunement
(the particular information that is picked up) of both persons indi-
vidually, but their actions are also dependent on the action of the
other person. “What the infant affords the mother, is reciprocal to
what the mother affords the infant” (Gibson, 1986, p. 135). Thus,
social affordances are actively created and maintained by the joint
action of two or more persons (Good, 2007). This is consistent
with the idea that interactors’ perception-action loops are coupled
and interlaced with each other and that in social interaction agents
participate in each other’s sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009).
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT IN AUTISM
It has been claimed that ToM theory can explain the social-
communicative impairments of autism spectrum disorders (ASD;
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985): “We have reason to believe that autistic
children lack such a “theory.” If this were so, then they would be
unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behavior”
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985, p. 37). I have introduced the concept of
social affordances as an alternative to ToM. Since affordance per-
ception is based on the pick-up of information, the explanation
for the social-communicative impairments in ASD from an eco-
logical perspective should be sought in differences in information
pick-up between people with and without ASD and the cascading
effects this will have for the interaction. Several theories and stud-
ies have indicated that both children and adults with ASD pick-up
different information compared to people without ASD (Mottron
et al., 2006; Gepner and Féron, 2009; De Jaegher, 2013; Donnellan
et al., 2013). An example might be emotion perception. Emotions
can be viewed as social affordances in the sense that they call forth
various interpersonal behaviors. For example, anger is likely to
provoke avoidance, whereas joy is likely to encourage approach
(McArthur and Baron, 1983). Studies show that the information
that speciﬁes facial expressions is a speciﬁc spatial integration of
different facial features changing in a characteristic way. Perceivers
respond to changes in the whole facial conﬁguration. That infor-
mation is critical and sufﬁcient for face recognition and emotion
perception (Tanaka et al., 1998; Behrmann et al., 2006a; Pellicano
et al., 2006), and is largely supported by low spatial frequency
information (Goffaux and Rossion, 2006). Studies indicate that
individuals with ASD are less sensitive to conﬁgurations than peo-
plewithoutASDand showenhanced sensitivity in response to high
spatial frequency (ﬁne perceptual detail, sharp edges) versus low
spatial frequency (general shape and large contour) stimulus infor-
mation, compared to typically developing and developmentally
delayed children and both for neutral as well as socially rele-
vant stimuli (Deruelle et al., 2004; Vlamings et al., 2010). This is
in accordance with personal accounts: “I did not see the whole.
I saw hair, I saw eyes, nose, mouth, chin, . . . not face.” (Alex
in Williams, 1999, p. 180). These studies suggest that the facial
expression may not afford the “typical” social behavior for people
with ASD, because the facial expression, speciﬁed by conﬁgural
information, may be difﬁcult to perceive for persons with ASD.
Studies on biological motion support the idea that affordances
are speciﬁed by a particular type of information that is detected
by typically developing individuals, but not by individuals with
ASD. Johansson (1973) has designed experiments in which a few
spots show the motions of the main joints of a person. When
a moving presentation of this minimal information is shown to
typically developing persons they can tell whether the point-light
display is walking, dancing, ﬁghting, etc. Studies show that chil-
dren with autism have difﬁculties recognizing biological motion
and emotion from point-light displays, while typically develop-
ing children and children with spatial deﬁcits and a degree of
mental retardation are able to do that (Jordan et al., 2002; Blake
et al., 2003; Annaz et al., 2010; Nackaerts et al., 2012). Children
with ASD also show a different pattern of eye movements while
seeing point-light displays (Nackaerts et al., 2012). Other stud-
ies that have tested information pick-up through eye-tracking
methods conﬁrm that there are clear differences in information
pick-up between people with and without ASD (Klin et al., 2002).
This means that what a situation affords for a person with ASD
is often different from what the same situation affords for a
personwithout ASD.
In addition, as stated before, behavior affords behavior. There-
fore the different information pick-up of a person with ASD will
not only affect the actions of that person, but also the actions of
the other person(s) in the interaction. Typically, although there
may be many individual differences in the affordances that people
perceive, there is some common ground in the sense that persons
that are somewhat similar in capabilities, experience and culture
perceive the same affordances in social interaction, i.e., they will
act alike in a similar social context. However, it is well-known
that a person with ASD will often act differently than a person
without ASD in the same context, both in relation to the phys-
ical and to the social environment. Gibson (1986) notes that in
order to become socialized a child has to perceive the affordances
for herself as well as for others. In an interaction between a per-
son with and without ASD, the dyadic partners may not be able
to perceive the affordances of the other person and this may dis-
rupt the rhythm of interaction. Trevarthen and Daniel (2005)
have for instance shown that parents of children with ASD have
difﬁculties in engaging with their child and that these interac-
tions are characterized by less rhythmic interaction. In triadic
interactions involving an object, the fact that two partners per-
ceive different affordances of the object may also lead to less
smooth interactions. Preference for producing or observing spin-
ning or rotating movements (spinning objects, watching washing
machine rotating, spinning wheels of toy cars) is for instance com-
mon in children with ASD (Bracha et al., 1995). If one child is
for instance continuously spinning the wheels of a toy car while
the other child is “driving” the car, this will probably decrease
the amount of social interaction between the children. Consistent
with the idea that a different affordance perception in ASD may
underlie their social-communicative impairments, several stud-
ies have indicated that disturbances in basic perception-action
process may underlie and are related to social-communicative
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impairments (Mottron et al., 2006; Gepner and Féron, 2009; De
Jaegher, 2013; Donnellan et al., 2013; Kapp, 2013; Hellendoorn
et al., 2014).
Although it should be taken into account that ASD is a per-
vasive developmental disorder which affects many developmental
domains (Yirmiya and Charman, 2010), it is important that it
is explained why there are more differences in the perception of
social affordances between people with and without ASD than
in the perception of affordances in the physical environment.
Gibson (1986) already notes that: “The richest and most elabo-
rate affordances of the environment are provided by other people.
They move from place to place, changing the postures of their
bodies. . . . The perceiving of these mutual affordances is enor-
mously complex” (p. 135). Thus, there may be two explanations
as to why social-communicative impairments are so pronounced
in individuals with ASD. First of all, the perception of social affor-
dances is different from the perception of affordances of objects
because of the nature of social information. The social information
consists of many features, is dynamic and multimodal (McArthur
and Baron, 1983). Several studies show that children with ASD
have speciﬁc difﬁculties, both delays and impairments, with per-
ceiving dynamic and conﬁgural information, also in non-social
situations (Deruelle et al., 2004; Behrmann et al., 2006b; Gep-
ner and Féron, 2009; Annaz et al., 2010; Vlamings et al., 2010;
Weisberg et al., 2014). This implies that the differences in per-
ceiving social affordances between people with and without ASD
cannot be attributed to the fact that the information is social per se,
but to the fact that a lot of social affordances are speciﬁed by
information that is difﬁcult to pick-up for people with ASD.
Another reason that may explain why people with ASD have the
most difﬁculties in the social-communicative domain, may be
related to the aforementioned idea that the different affordance
perception of a person with ASD has cascading and possibly
disrupting effects for the whole interaction since social affor-
dances are actively created and maintained by the joint action
of the actors in the interaction (Good, 2007). Thus, the affor-
dances in the interaction between a person with ASD and a person
without ASD will be different than the affordances in the inter-
action between two persons without ASD. It may even be that
the social interaction affords a person with ASD to disengage,
because the different perception of affordances makes the inter-
action very unpredictable, uncontrollable and stressful for them.
Without interaction with other persons, the person with ASD will
never learn to perceive the affordances and moreover, disengage-
ment prevents the creation of affordances in interactionwith other
persons.
For some people with ASD social interaction affords a kind
of disengagement in the sense that they explicitly theorize about
social interaction, instead of engaging (Williams, 2004). Below
are a few examples of how high-functioning people with ASD
describe what they are doing in the social environment: “I was
a scientist trying to ﬁgure out the ways of the natives. I wanted
to participate, but I didn’t know how” (Grandin, 1996, p. 132;
cited in Williams, 2004). “By studying an individual’s posture,
actions, voice tone, and expression, I can now usually work
out what they are feeling.” (Lawson, 2001, pp. 8–9; cited in
Williams, 2004). The fact that high-functioning individuals with
ASD can and do reason about social behavior does not imply
that persons with ASD use ToM-style operations. In contrast,
the fact that people with ASD act in this way in social interac-
tion, while those that develop typically do not to theorize about
social behavior in most social interactions, may actually show
that they do not perceive the same affordances in a social envi-
ronment. While the social environment affords engagement for
the typically developing persons it affords detached theorizing
for these high-functioning persons with ASD. As Reddy (2008)
notes any “theory theory” is a very different understanding than
skilled interaction with the environment: more like the under-
standing of a bystander than that of participant. This is also
supported by studies that show that the performance of persons
in ToM-like operations is not related to the skills people have
in real-life engagement with other persons (Ozonoff and Miller,
1995).
TOWARD DIFFERENT RESEARCH METHODS
Investigating social competence from an affordance approach
requires different research methods than the methods that have
been used to investigate social skills within a ToM paradigm.
Research within the affordance approach should provide us with a
description of the information people are responding to in social
interaction, i.e., a description of which information people use
to inform their actions. People with typical and atypical devel-
opment, but also for instance children and adults, could then
be compared to examine whether there are differences in the
information they pick-up and use in social interaction. While
the study of Klin et al. (2002) already provides an interesting
example of such a design comparing people with and without
autism with regard to their focus of attention while viewing a
social scene, the participants in that study were still rather pas-
sive and detached from the interaction because the social scenes
they watched were displayed on a video screen, and it was not an
immersed situation. In line with the idea that cognition emerges
in the interaction in a continuous perception-action cycle wherein
behavior affords behavior, a study design with mobile eye track-
ing and coding of behavior of all participants in a real-time
social interaction could provide the data that ﬁts within the
affordance approach to social perception. Since the actions of
one person shape the actions of the other person (i.e., behavior
affords behavior) more attention should also be given to research
methods that measure variables of the interaction (inter-personal
variables) instead of only focusing on intra- personal variables.
De Jaegher (2006) states for instance that timing is a founda-
tional aspect of successful social interaction which is disturbed
in ASD.
In conclusion, “overcoming the myth of the mental,” as
Dreyfus (2006) states it, is difﬁcult as is indicated by the popu-
larity of ToM approaches and other approaches that ﬁt within
a cognitivist tradition. An embodied ecological perspective may
offer a fruitful alternative to these approaches for studying both
social and non-social cognition. The concept of affordances does
justice to the idea that mind and behavior cannot be separated.
People with ASD are not attuned to the same information as
people without ASD. This leads to the speciﬁcation of different
affordances and may have cascading effects for the interaction
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with other persons. In conclusion, not only do people with autism
experience or understand the world differently from other peo-
ple, the environment (including other persons) really affords
different behavior, simply because they are in it (Loveland,
2001).
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